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Over the past years, education attainment has increased at an unprecedented rate in Great Britain. 
We analyze how the education expansion affected inequality in household net incomes since the early 
2000s. We show that, all else being equal, education composition changes led to higher living standards 
mostly through higher wages. As education expansion led to larger income gains in the middle and top 
than at the bottom of the distribution, income inequality increased. Despite the increasing share of 
high-educated workers, we find limited evidence of a “compression” effect on inequality, as the higher 
education wage premium remained broadly unchanged.
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1. IntroductIon
Over the past years, there has been an unprecedented increase in education 
attainment in Great Britain. The share of individuals completing full-time educa-
tion aged 16 fell by 37 percent between 2001 and 2017; whilst the share of individ-
uals completing education aged 17–19 (beyond compulsory education) increased 
by 47 percent and the share of those completing education aged 20+ (in Higher 
Education) increased for women by 66 percent and for men by 49 percent (Table 1).
These large structural changes in education have important consequences for 
income inequality. For developing countries in particular, it has been noted that 
the returns to education are convex and hence, an equally distributed expansion of 
education among low- and high-skilled can lead to a rise in inequality (Battistón 
et al., 2014). Bourguignon et al. (2004) refer to this link between education and 
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inequality as the “paradox of progress.” The literature on the effect of education 
on income inequality emphasizes the “composition” and “compression” effects of 
education expansion (Knight and Sabot, 1983; Gregorio and Lee, 2002, Rehme, 
2007, Teulings and van Rens, 2008). As the relative size of the high-education 
group increases—i.e. the “composition” effect—inequality goes up initially; even-
tually inequality goes down as fewer low-educated people remain. As the share of 
educated workers increases, the higher education (HE) wage premium goes down 
which in turn lowers inequality—i.e. the “compression” effect.
The link between the recent education trends and household net income 
inequality in Great Britain is not well understood and the aim of this paper is to 
provide an in-depth account of this relationship for the period 2001–17. Our paper 
contributes to the literature by studying changes along the distribution of income 
and covering the recent period of education expansion.
We contribute directly to the literature on education and income inequality. 
Coady and Dizioli (2018) study the relationship between inequality of disposable 
income and education in many different countries between 1980 and 2010. They 
find that income inequality increases with inequality in education and average years 
of schooling. Eika et al. (2019) study the impact of education changes on inequal-
ity of earnings among couples in the US, UK, Denmark, Germany and Norway. 
Focusing on changes to educational assortative mating, they find that these matter 
little for explaining trends in inequality. Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2015) decompose 
changes to income inequality in Great Britain, by income source and household 
characteristics. For education, they find that between 1991 and 2008–09 education 
quantity effects (changes to the distribution of education) raised inequality, while 
price effects (changes to the returns to education) mitigated this increase. Overall, 
the relationship between the recent education changes and inequality of household 
net income in Great Britain remains relatively understudied.
TABLE 1  
educatIon shares by age at WhIch completed Full-tIme educatIon (In %)
2001 2007 2011 2017
Men
Aged 16 or less 60.1 53.3 45.7 39.5
Aged 17–19 19.1 21.7 26.9 29.3
Aged 20+ 20.9 25.0 27.4 31.2
Women
Aged 16 or less 57.1 50.1 42.5 34.7
Aged 17–19 23.4 25.8 31.3 33.0
Aged 20+ 19.5 24.1 26.1 32.3
All
Aged 16 or less 58.6 51.7 44.1 37.1
Aged 17–19 21.3 23.8 29.1 31.2
Aged 20+ 20.2 24.5 26.8 31.8
Notes: Sample includes individuals aged 15 to 64. Individuals are classified into the three categories 
using information on age completed full-time education (Family Resources Survey variable “tea”) or, if  
missing, using information on their age and whether presently in full-time education (variable “fted”).
Source: Author’s calculations using the Family Resources Survey for 2001/02 (2001), 2007/08 
(2007), 2011/12 (2011) and 2017/18 (2017).
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Blundell et al. (2018) and Brewer et al. (2009) study inequality changes in 
Great Britain but they do not look at the compression and composition effects of 
education expansion. Blundell et al. (2018) focus in particular on how changes in 
the labor market have contributed to inequality. Brewer et al. (2009) look at 
inequality changes between and within education groups. They find that earnings 
inequality fell within education groups and the gap in incomes by education groups 
narrowed in the 1990s and early 2000s.1
Our paper also relates to a large body of income decomposition literature 
studying how tax-benefit policy changes alone or policy changes versus other fac-
tors have contributed to inequality changes (e.g. Sefton et al., 2009; Bargain and 
Callan, 2010; De Agostini et al., 2018; Paulus et al., 2020; Paulus and Tasseva, 
2020).
In more detail, we estimate the separate effects on the income distribution of 
changes to the HE wage premia, other changes to wages, and changes to the com-
position of education. We also estimate the effect of changes to tax-benefit policies 
on incomes. By creating counterfactual distributions of income, the contribution 
of each of the factors is estimated in isolation from other changes, e.g. we isolate 
the contribution of the increased amount of education to changes in the income 
distribution, holding constant the graduate pay premium and income tax rule. We 
are also able to examine all these effects across the whole income distribution.
Our approach is to combine the methods of Bargain and Callan (2010) and 
Bourguignon et al. (2008). Using a tax-benefit microsimulation model, we separate 
out the changes to tax-benefit policies from the changes to the distribution of gross 
market incomes and the composition of the population. Using a regression-based 
approach and re-weighting, we then decompose the latter two to identify the impact 
on the income distribution of changes in the HE pay premia, education composi-
tion and other population changes. The data used come from the Family Resources 
Survey for Great Britain for 2001/02, 2007/08, 2011/12 and 2017/18. We analyze 
separately the periods 2001–07 (boom/pre-crisis), 2007–11 (crisis) and 2011–17 
(post-crisis), which broadly capture diverging trends in the economy and the 
income distribution.2
First, we estimate the distributional impact from changes to the HE wage pre-
mium. We find that the education earnings differentials have remained broadly 
unchanged (consistent with Walker and Zhu, 2008; Machin, 2011; Blundell et al., 
2016) and so there is little impact on the distribution of household net incomes: 
we estimate a small reduction in inequality due to a fall in the HE wage premia 
among white British women only, in 2001–07 and 2011–17; but no change to the 
HE returns among other types of worker. Hence, overall we find limited evidence 
for an education “compression” effect on inequality in the full period 2001–17.
1For the 1970s and 1980s, Brewer et al. (2009) find the reverse: an increased gap in earnings and 
household net incomes within and between education groups.
2For example, unemployment was falling between 2001 and 2006, then gradually rose until 2011 
and has been going down since then (Office for National Statistics, series MGSX). Similar trend can be 
seen for other aggregate economic measures such as government net borrowing (deficit) (Eurostat, indi-
cator gov_10dd_edpt1). Looking at household living standards, median net income was going up in the 
2000s; then as the crisis hit, net income went down in 2009–11; and has been going up again since then 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2019a).
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Second, we find evidence for an education “composition” effect. Our results 
show that, fixing the HE wage premium, education expansion raised living stan-
dards through higher earnings and other market incomes. As a result of the educa-
tion expansion, real mean household income grew by 3.6 percent in the pre-crisis 
period (2001–07), by 3 percent during the crisis (2007–11) and by further 3.8 per-
cent in the post-crisis years (2011–17). However, the income gains due to education 
made net incomes more unequal as the gains were larger in the middle and top, 
than at the bottom of the distribution. This is consistent with the evidence for dif-
ferent countries by Coady and Dizioli (2018) and for Great Britain between 1991 
and 2008–09 by Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2015).
Overall, we find that income inequality for the middle 95 percent of the income 
distribution slightly fell since the 2000s. This was despite the upward pressure due 
to education. Between 2001 and 2011, it was due to changes in the tax-benefit 
system, which were equalizing by benefiting mostly the bottom of the income dis-
tribution (consistent with e.g. Sefton et al., 2009; De Agostini et al., 2018; Paulus 
et al., 2020). Between 2011 and 2017, depending on the inequality indicator, policy 
changes either reinforced or offset the inequality-increasing impact of education 
expansion. Although not statistically significant, changes to wages (other than to 
the HE returns) pushed down inequality in the post-crisis period.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 and Section 3 describe 
the methodology, data and the tax-benefit model EUROMOD, Section 4 discusses 
the results and Section 5 concludes.
2. methodology
The central question addressed in this paper is, other things being equal, what 
was the contribution of education composition and education premium changes 
to changes in the distribution of household net incomes in Great Britain since the 
early 2000s. To answer this, we need to separate the effect of education trends from 
everything else that could have affected household incomes, such as changes to 
benefit entitlements and tax liabilities, other compositional changes in the society, 
or other changes to market incomes. To identify the contribution to total income 
changes of these different factors, we employ decomposition techniques. The basic 
idea is that starting from the observed end-period income distribution, we can 
work our way backwards to the observed start-period distribution by construct-
ing intermediate counterfactual distributions. By changing different factors one 
step at a time, the counterfactuals gradually become less like the end-period and 
more similar and eventually identical to the start-period distribution. A compar-
ison between the different distributions unveils the contribution of each factor to 
the total change.
First, we decompose the total change in household net incomes into the impact 
due to changes in population characteristics and market incomes (PCMI) and to 
changes to tax and benefit policies (TBP). The method follows on the work by 
Bargain and Callan (2010) who propose a formal framework based on Shorrocks-
Shapley decomposition and using a tax-benefit calculator.
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Second, we decompose the PCMI effect into the part due to changes in the 
amount of education; the part due to changes to the pay premium by education; 
and a residual. The method is based on Bourguignon et al. (2008) who build on the 
work by Juhn et al. (1993) and DiNardo et al. (1996) and propose a regression-based 
approach and/or re-weighting suitable for decomposing changes in the income dis-
tribution. The method builds on the literature generalizing the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition of changes in the mean to changes along the distribution of wages.3
Although not central to the analysis, a limitation of the approaches adopted 
in this paper is that we do not estimate separately behavioral responses to tax- 
benefit changes. These are part of the PCMI effect. Furthermore, the decomposi-
tion of the PCMI effect due to changes in education is of a descriptive nature as 
changes to the education composition and the returns to education do not occur 
exogenously.
In the rest of the section, we first present formally how we decompose the 
total change in the income distribution into PCMI and TBP effects. Second, we 
explain how the PCMI effect can be further decomposed to identify the impact of 
education changes on the income distribution.
2.1. Decomposing the Total Change
Formally, let I be a distribution of household net income (or a functional such 
as Gini or mean income) and expressed as a function f(d, e, x, y, o) where d denotes 
the design and parameters of tax-benefit policies (e.g. progressive vs flat tax, 20 
percent tax rate, a child benefit of £15 per week), e education level (completed 
education aged 16 or less, aged 17–19, aged 20+), x a vector of other individual/
household characteristics, y gross earnings and o other individual/household gross 
market incomes (e.g. self-employment income). The change in the distribution I 
between two periods (0 and 1) is
An intermediate, counterfactual distribution is next added (and subtracted) 
as a function of d from the end-period but e, x, y and o from the start-period. It 
yields the identity:
The purpose of  adding the counterfactual is to answer two questions: i) given 
the tax-benefit regime in the end-period, what would have been the impact on I 
if  we would go back to the population and distribution of  market incomes from 
3See Fortin et al. (2011) for an overview of the literature that decomposes changes in the earnings 
distribution.
(1) ΔI= f(d1, e1, x1, y1, o1)− f(d0, e0, x0, y0, o0).
(2)
ΔI= f(d1, e1, x1, y1, o1)− f(d1, e0, x0, y0, o0)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
population characteristics andmarket income effect (nominal)
+ f(d1, e0, x0, y0, o0)− f(d0, e0, x0, y0, o0)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
tax-benefit policy effect (nominal)
.
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the start-period; and ii) given the population and distribution of  market incomes 
from the start-period, what would have been the impact on I if  tax-benefit poli-
cies from the end-period were in place? The first term answers i) which identifies 
the contribution of  changes to population characteristics and market incomes 
(PCMI) (conditional on d from the end-period) on the total change in I. The sec-
ond term answers ii) which identifies the contribution of  changes to tax-benefit 
policies (TBP) (conditional on e, x, y and o from the start-period) on the total 
change in I.
In the counterfactual, tax-benefit amounts from the end-period d1 are applied 
on gross market incomes from the start-period y0 and o0. To make these compara-
ble (as £1 in period 1 is worth less than £1 in period 0), equation 2 is extended to 
include two counterfactuals in which y0, o0 and d0 are adjusted for inflation by a 
factor α = Consumer Price Index:
For a scale-dependent measure (e.g. mean income), the sum of the first two 
terms in equation 3 gives the real change in I and the third term captures the effect 
of price changes on (start-period) incomes. For a scale-independent measure (e.g. 
the Gini coefficient) the nominal effect equals 0 as a change in the nominal levels of 
both tax-benefit policy amounts and market incomes should not affect the relative 
position of households in the income distribution (Bargain and Callan, 2010). In 
the results section, we provide estimates of the first two terms only.
The decomposition is path-dependent, i.e. the order in which the different 
effects are estimated can differ. For example, the change in I can be decomposed by 
conditioning the PCMI effect either on end- or start-period policies. No one com-
bination is preferable over the other. Thus, we follow here the approach by Paulus 
and Tasseva (2020, p. 8) to derive all possible combinations and to calculate the 
PCMI and TBP effect as the average effect across all combinations.
2.2. Decomposing the changes in PCMI
We decompose the PCMI effect on I to the HE wage premia and separately 
to other changes to wages (hereafter changes to wages), using a regression-based 
approach. We then separately identify the contribution of changes to the education 
composition, using re-weighting. Further details are given below.
By constructing new counterfactuals, the first term in equation (3) is decom-
posed as:
(3)
ΔI= f(d1, e1, x1, y1, o1)− f(d1, e0, x0, 훼y0, 훼o0)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
i) population characteristics andmarket income effect (real)
+ f(d1, e0, x0, 훼y0, 훼o0)− f(훼d0, e0, x0, 훼y0, 훼o0)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
ii) tax-benefit policy effect (real)
+ f(훼d0, e0, x0, 훼y0, 훼o0)− f(d0, e0, x0, y0, o0)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
iii) nominal effect
.
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In term iv) in equation (4), we estimate the impact on the income distribution 
of changes to wages, but fixing the HE wage premia and amount of education at 
their t = 1 levels. We construct the counterfactual in iv) as follows: first, the follow-
ing four models of wages are estimated:
where lny𝑤𝐵𝑚
i(ℎ𝑡)
, lny𝑛𝑤𝐵𝑚
i(ℎ𝑡)
, lny𝑤𝐵𝑤
i(ℎ𝑡)
 and lny𝑛𝑤𝐵𝑤
i(ℎ𝑡)
 are the log of monthly earnings of indi-
vidual i in household h in period t for the sample of white British men (wBm), 
non-white-British men (nwBm), white British women (wBw) and non-white-Brit-
ish women (nwBw), respectively. The e’s denote the individual level of education 
while the x’s are a set of other observable individual/household characteristics. The 
residual terms are denoted by 휖i(ht), 𝜂i(ℎ𝑡), 𝜇i(ℎ𝑡) and 𝜐i(ℎ𝑡).
4 The returns to individual/
household characteristics are denoted with 훽t, 훾 t, 휋t, 휌t and those to education with 
휆t, 훿t, 휈t, 휃t.
(4)
ΔIi)= f(d1, e1, x1, y1, o1)− f(d1, e1, x1, y
⋀훽
⋀
0, 훾
⋀
0,휋
⋀
0, 휌
⋀
0, 휆
⋀
1, 훿
⋀
1, 휈
⋀
1, 휃
⋀
1, e1 , o1)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
iv) changes towages
+ f(d1, e1, x1, y
⋀훽
⋀
0, 훾
⋀
0,휋
⋀
0, 휌
⋀
0, 휆
⋀
1, 훿
⋀
1, 휈
⋀
1, 휃
⋀
1, e1 , o1)− f(d1, e1, x1, y
⋀훽
⋀
0, 훾
⋀
0,휋
⋀
0, 휌
⋀
0, 휆
⋀
0, 훿
⋀
1, 휈
⋀
1, 휃
⋀
1, e1 , o1)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
v) changes to returns toHE forwhite Britishmen
+ f(d1, e1, x1, y
⋀훽
⋀
0, 훾
⋀
0,휋
⋀
0, 휌
⋀
0, 휆
⋀
0, 훿
⋀
1, 휈
⋀
1, 휃
⋀
1, e1 , o1)− f(d1, e1, x1, y
⋀훽
⋀
0, 훾
⋀
0,휋
⋀
0, 휌
⋀
0, 휆
⋀
0, 훿
⋀
0, 휈
⋀
1, 휃
⋀
1, e1 , o1)
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x) residual
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(5)
lny푤퐵푚
i(ht)
=x푤퐵푚
i(ht)
훽t+e
푤퐵푚
i(ht)
휆t+휖i(ht)
lny푛푤퐵푚
i(ht)
=x푛푤퐵푚
i(ht)
훾 t+e
푛푤퐵푚
i(ht)
훿t+휂i(ht)
lny푤퐵푤
i(ht)
=x푤퐵푤
i(ht)
휋t+e
푤퐵푤
i(ht)
휈t+휇i(ht)
lny푛푤퐵푤
i(ht)
=x푛푤퐵푤
i(ht)
휌t+e
푛푤퐵푤
i(ht)
휃t+휐i(ht),
4Since the data used in the paper are cross-sectional, we do not have repeated observations for in-
dividuals and households which we note with parenthesis i(ht) in equation (5).
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Wages are then predicted for the t = 1 sample of workers by: (1) applying the 
coefficients 훽
⋀
0, 훾
⋀
0, 휋
⋀
0 and 휌
⋀
0 from the models estimated on t = 0 data, (2) applying 
the returns to higher education (HE) from the models estimated on t = 1 data, 
and (3) adjusting the predicted residuals by the ratio of the estimated standard 
deviation of the residuals in t = 0 and t = 1. The counterfactual distribution of 
wages (ŷ훽̂0,훾̂0,휋̂0,휌̂0,휆̂1,훿̂1,휈̂1,휃̂1,e1) represents workers wages in t = 1 if  they were renu-
merated according to the returns prevailing in t = 0. By adjusting the predicted 
residuals, changes in the variation of the unobservables are also captured in the 
counterfactual.
In terms v) to viii) in equation (4), we use the same procedure as above but 
apply the returns to HE from the models estimated on t  =  0 data. In this way, 
we assess the impact of changes to the returns to HE, i.e. the education compres-
sion effect, for: v) white British men (ŷ훽̂0,훾̂0,휋̂0,휌̂0,휆̂0,훿̂1,휈̂1,휃̂1,e1); vi) non-white-British men 
(ŷ훽̂0,훾̂0,휋̂0,휌̂0,휆̂0,훿̂0,휈̂1,휃̂1,e1); vii) white British women (ŷ훽̂0,훾̂0,휋̂0,휌̂0,휆̂0,훿̂0,휈̂0,휃̂1,e1); and viii) non-
white-British women (ŷ훽̂0,훾̂0,휋̂0,휌̂0,휆̂0,훿̂0,̂휐0,휃̂0,e1 ). For more details on how we construct 
the wage counterfactuals, see Appendix A.
The term ix) in equation (4) captures the contribution of changes in the 
amount of education, i.e. the education composition effect. To construct the coun-
terfactual, we use re-weighting to identify the impact of increased education attain-
ment on I. The re-weighting approach follows on the algorithm by Gomulka 
(1992), which minimizes a function of the differences between the base and target 
weights. In more detail, the household survey data weights in t = 1 (base weights) 
are adjusted, so that the education shares (completed education aged 16 or less, 
aged 17–19, aged 20+) in t = 1 correspond to the education shares in t = 0 (target 
weights). Furthermore, we account for the relative change in education shares 
along the following dimensions: age (5-year bands), sex (male/female) and house-
hold type (with/without children and with 1/2+ adults in the household).5 By 
re-weighting and building on the counterfactual from term viii), another wage 
counterfactual distribution (ŷ훽̂0,훾̂0,휋̂0,휌̂0,휆̂0,훿̂0,휈̂0,휃̂0,̂e0) is constructed in which the educa-
tion level of the population in t = 1 is like of the population in t = 0 (e
⋀
0). The coun-
terfactual distribution of education affects not only wages but also other forms of 
market incomes, as after the re-weighting more/less weight is given to certain 
household types (classified by education level, age and sex) who may also be more 
or less likely to receive certain market incomes (e.g. from private pensions and 
investment income).
The term x) in equation (4) captures the residual, i.e. the impact on the income 
distribution of all other changes to market incomes and population characteristics 
not accounted for by the decomposition, e.g. changes in the distribution of self- 
employment income, migration etc.
5We make use of the Stata command reweight2 by Browne (2012).
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2019
9
© 2020 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
In all counterfactuals in terms iv) to x) we apply tax-benefit policies from t = 1 
using a tax-benefit model. In each scenario the model calculates the counterfactual 
benefit entitlements and tax liabilities of each individual/household in the end-pe-
riod, on the basis of their counterfactual wages/education level and end-period 
other market incomes and characteristics. Thus, although tax-benefit policies are 
the same across the counterfactuals, the level of benefits and taxes differ across 
scenarios in response to the wage/education changes. Household gross incomes 
minus personal taxes and minus national insurance contributions (NI) gives the 
distribution of household net incomes in each counterfactual.
Finally, we provide bootstrapped standard errors for the change in mean 
income and income inequality. We construct a bootstrap sample for each data year 
by sampling households with replacement and drawing the same number of house-
holds as the unweighted sample. We draw 400 bootstrap samples and carry out the 
decomposition analysis for each one of them. Our estimates account for sample 
variation but not measurement error.
3. data and the tax-beneFIt model euromod
We use data from the Family Resources Survey (FRS), which is a purpose 
built income survey, for 2001/02, 2007/08, 2011/12 and 2017/18 (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2005, 2014a, 2014b, 2019b). The data are cross-sectional, 
nationally representative and contain rich information on individual and house-
holds characteristics and circumstances. The FRS serves as the main source for 
official statistics on incomes, poverty and inequality in the UK: see e.g. the latest 
report on “Households Below Average Incomes” produced by the Department for 
Work and Pensions (2019a) or the annual reports on income trends by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (e.g. Bourquin et al., 2019). Thus, the data can be considered as 
the “golden” benchmark for distributional analysis in the UK and are the perfect 
data source to analyze the interactions between person’s characteristics, such as the 
level of education, gross market incomes and the tax-benefit rules.
To mitigate the risk of measurement error at the bottom of the income distri-
bution (Brewer et al., 2017), we trim the sample by dropping the poorest 4 percent 
in each survey year. Jenkins (2017) shows that Households Below Average Incomes 
(HBAI) estimates, derived entirely from the FRS data, do not capture changes at 
the top of the income distribution. Therefore, we also drop the richest 1 percent in 
each survey year to reduce measurement error at the top of the distribution. For 
similar approaches, see Belfield et al. (2017) and Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2015). 
Thus, our analysis focuses on the middle 95 percent of the distribution and ignores 
inequality at the tails. Furthermore, households from Northern Ireland were 
included in the survey only from 2002/03 onwards and so, we restrict the sample 
to Great Britain.
To derive household net incomes, we combine information on gross market 
incomes from the FRS with information on benefit entitlements, income tax liabil-
ities and NI contributions obtained from a tax-benefit microsimulation model. We 
use the model EUROMOD to calculate benefits, income tax and NI contributions 
for the actual as well as counterfactual income distributions. This is a standard 
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practice in the decomposition literature which separates changes in the income 
distribution into direct policy effect (i.e. changes to tax and benefit policies) and 
population characteristics and market income effect (using EUROMOD, see e.g. 
Bargain and Callan, 2010; using IFS TAXBEN, see e.g. Joyce and Sibieta, 2013). 
EUROMOD contains syntax of functions which determine a) who—e.g. a family 
with certain characteristics/market incomes—is entitled to receive a certain ben-
efit or liable to pay an income tax/NI and b) the size of the benefit entitlement/
personal tax/NI. The syntax reflects the policy rules (design, percentage rates and 
amounts) on 30th of June in 2001, 2007, 2011 and 2017. EUROMOD reads the 
FRS micro-data on market incomes and socio-economic characteristics and based 
on the policy rules it calculates individual/household benefit entitlements, income 
tax and NI liabilities.
To ensure EUROMOD calculations (given the policy rules and FRS data) 
reflect the actual income distribution in a given year, the model is regularly tested 
and validated against official statistics on benefit spending and recipients/tax rev-
enues and payers, and the income distribution. The quality control checks are 
carried out by a team of researchers at the University of Essex, UK responsible 
for the maintenance and updating of EUROMOD. The model is publicly avail-
able for research purposes and user feedback is fed into the validation process. 
For more information on the UK model see the Country Report by De Agostini 
(2018). For a model description and a literature review of research applications 
with EUROMOD, see Sutherland and Figari (2013) and Figari et al. (2015).
The measure of household net income in this analysis is cash income and is 
the sum of gross market incomes, national insurance benefits, means-tested ben-
efits, state pensions minus direct income taxes and NI contributions. To account 
for household composition and economies of scale, we equivalise household net 
incomes using the commonly used modified OECD equivalence scale.
For more information on the data (i.e. education and ethnicity variables, defi-
nition of household net income and sample adjustments), see Appendix B.
4. results
We begin by documenting the broad distributional changes in the pre-crisis 
(2001–07), crisis (2007–11) and post-crisis (2011–17) periods, showing that our 
results using simulated incomes are consistent with the existing evidence. In the 
second part of the section, we analyze how much of the income changes along the 
distribution were attributed to changes to population characteristics and market 
incomes (PCMI) and its components—in particular education changes—and to 
changes to tax-benefit policies (TBP). In the final part of the section, we look at 
the contribution of education changes to changes in aggregate measures of income 
inequality.
4.1. Trends in income inequality
We first replicate the broad inequality trends (between 2001 and 2017) that 
have been documented elsewhere (e.g. Belfield et al., 2014; Jenkins, 2017; Bourquin 
et al., 2019), using our simulated incomes derived from EUROMOD model based 
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on FRS data. Table 2 shows the change in five measures of inequality in 2001–07, 
2007–11 and 2011–17, focusing on the middle 95 percent of the income distribution.
Inequality remained broadly unchanged in the first part of the 2000s (2001–
07). In 2007–11, there was a small, statistically significant drop in inequality for 
the Gini coefficient (statistically significant at the 10 percent level) and for the 
Atkinson index with aversion parameters of 1 and 2 (statistically significant at the 
5 percent level). In 2011–17, we estimate a statistically significant drop in inequality 
only for the coefficient of variation. In 2017, the last year of observation, the Gini 
coefficient was 0.26; the Atkinson index with aversion parameter of 0.5, 1 and 2 
was 0.05, 0.10 and 0.19, respectively; the coefficient of variation was 0.5.
To understand better what is behind the inequality changes, Figure 1a shows 
the real change in mean household net income by ventiles (1–20) and for the whole 
population (All) in each period. (We return to Figure  1b in Section  4.2.) Mean 
incomes (All) grew by 8.6 percent between 2001 and 2007. Incomes rose at all points 
of the distribution although the poorest ventile saw its income grow less than the 
rest of the distribution. The 3rd and 4th ventiles enjoyed the strongest income 
growth. Between 2007 and 2011, the population mean (All) did not change but that 
masked different trends along the distribution: income growth was pro-poor with 
the largest income gains at the bottom of the distribution. Incomes increased for 
the first 6 ventile groups, with the strongest growth enjoyed by the 1st to 4th income 
ventiles. The richest 20th ventile also experienced a small income gain, although 
this was not statistically significantly different from zero. For the rest of the distri-
bution incomes fell, although again these changes were not statistically significant. 
Between 2011 and 2017, incomes grew by 5.8 percent on average (All). The change 
in incomes across the distribution was reverse U-shaped: with no statistically sig-
nificant changes for the bottom two ventiles; a drop for the 20th ventile, although 
not statistically significant; and gains along the rest of the distribution.
TABLE 2  
level oF and changes (In % poInts) to InequalIty
Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1) Atkinson (2) CV
Observed 2001 0.277*** 0.060*** 0.114*** 0.206*** 0.532***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
Observed 2007 0.275*** 0.059*** 0.112*** 0.202*** 0.530***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Observed 2011 0.268*** 0.056*** 0.106*** 0.190*** 0.526***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012)
Observed 2017 0.262*** 0.053*** 0.103*** 0.189*** 0.495***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Total change 
in 2001–07
−0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.004 −0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
Total change 
in 2007–11
−0.007* −0.003 −0.006** −0.012** −0.004
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012)
Total change 
in 2011–17
−0.006 −0.003 −0.004 −0.001 −0.031**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013)
Notes: Significance levels indicated as ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 and standard errors shown 
in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors after 400 replications.
Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
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Figure 1. (a) Change in Mean Incomes in 2001–07, 2007–11 and 2011–17. (b) Decomposing the 
Change in Mean Incomes in 2001–07, 2007–11 and 2011–17. 
Notes: (a) Shows the % change in 2007 mean net income in 2001–07 and 2007–11 and in 2011 
mean net income in 2011–17. (b) Decomposes the total change into the PCMI and TBP effects. 
Changes to incomes are in real terms. Household ranking is not fixed, based on the respective (actual or 
counterfactual) distribution of equivalized household net income. Confidence intervals are estimated 
after 400 bootstrap replications.
Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
(a)
(b)
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Appendix C provides evidence that our conclusions about the changes in the 
income distribution broadly hold, regardless of whether we use simulated incomes 
(based on EUROMOD and FRS data) or FRS reported incomes.
4.2. Decomposing income changes along the distribution
In this section, we decompose changes in net income at different points of 
the distribution, for the boom (2001–07), crisis (2007–11) and post-crisis (2011–
17) periods separately. Our aim is to understand what was the effect of education 
changes on household incomes. We begin by investigating how much of the income 
changes were attributed to changes to PCMI and its components focusing on edu-
cation composition changes and changes in the returns to HE. At the end of the 
section we also show the contribution of the TBP effect.
To summarize the main results, we find that the total PCMI effect had a dif-
ferent shape across the income distribution in the three periods of analysis, leading 
to gains and losses at different parts of the distribution. Nevertheless, what was 
common across the three periods is that the largest share of the PCMI effect in 
each period went to changes to wages and the education composition. Education 
composition changes on the whole benefited the upper part of the income distribu-
tion more than the bottom, increasing the gap between rich and poor. On the other 
hand, we find limited evidence for an education compression effect on the income 
distribution as the wage returns to HE remained broadly the same: the returns to 
HE for white British women only fell down slightly, reducing mean household net 
income. But the returns to HE for men and non-white-British women remained 
broadly unchanged and so, had no effect on the income distribution.
4.2.1. Income Changes in 2001–07
Figure 2 shows the results from the decomposition set out in equation (4), 
decomposing the real change in mean net income between 2001 and 2007 into the 
different PCMI components.6 The change in mean income is estimated by income 
ventiles (1–20) and for the whole population (All). Each graph corresponds to a 
different component of the PCMI effect, i.e. the contribution to income changes 
of: iv) changes to wages, excluding the returns to HE; v) to viii) changes to the HE 
wage premia by sex and ethnicity; ix) compositional changes to education; and x) 
a residual. In each graph, the PCMI component is illustrated in black (a black line 
for the income change across ventiles and a black circle for the income change for 
the whole population). The total change (a light grey line/circle) and the total 
PCMI effect (a dark grey line/circle) are illustrated repeatedly in each graph. 
Noteworthy, as we are comparing different household samples, households posi-
tion in the income distribution is not fixed.
Starting with the total PCMI effect, we find that it accounts for nearly all of 
the total change in mean income (light and dark grey circles above All nearly over-
lap in each graph). However, looking across the income distribution, the PCMI 
effect led to income gains that were almost linearly increasing in ventile groups, 
6To estimate the impact of changes to wages and the returns to HE, we estimate equation (5): the 
estimated coefficients are broadly as expected and full results are given in Appendix D.
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whereas the total change in net income was highest for the 3rd and 4th ventiles. 
Thus, the PCMI effect was pro-rich, with very small gains for the poorest ventiles 
and the largest gains concentrated in the top 12th–20th ventiles.
The main factors that contributed to the pro-rich income gains due to the 
PCMI effect were changes to wages (graph iv) and compositional changes to edu-
cation (graph ix). The changes to wages led to gains in net income that were larger 
for the second than the first half  of the distribution, and the gains due to education 
expansion (i.e. education composition changes) were monotonically increasing 
with income. The increases in net income due to education expansion, especially 
at the higher end of the distribution, exceeded those from the changes to wages. 
Thus, it was mainly the composition changes to education which led to increased 
gap between the top and bottom of the distribution.
When we break down the change in mean net income by income sources, we 
find that education expansion (ix) led to increases in net income mainly through 
earnings but also other market incomes: there were statistically significant increases 
in mean earnings (4 percent), self-employment income (0.5 percent) and other types 
of market incomes such as private pensions (0.8 percent) and investment income 
(0.4 percent). The gains from earnings, self-employment and investment income 
Figure 2. Decomposing the Change in Mean Incomes Between 2001 and 2007 
Notes: HE  =  higher education; wBm  =  white British men; nwBm  =  non-white-British men; 
wBw  =  white British women; nwBw  =  non-white-British women. The total change and the total 
PCMI effect are illustrated repeatedly in each graph. What differs across graphs is the change in 
net income due to the PCMI component. The PCMI components sum up to the total PCMI effect. 
Changes to incomes are in real terms. Household ranking is not fixed, based on the respective (actual or 
counterfactual) distribution of equivalized household net income. Confidence intervals are estimated 
after 400 bootstrap replications.
Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
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due to education composition changes were larger for the upper part of the distri-
bution while the gains from private pensions were somewhat more equal across the 
distribution. For results from this break-down, see Appendix E and Figure E.1.
Moving on to changes in the HE returns, we find a small drop of 0.28 percent 
in average household net income (for All), statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level, due to a reduction in the HE wage premium among white British female 
workers (component vii in Figure 2). But we do not find any changes to the HE 
wage premium among male workers or non-white-British female workers and 
hence, they do not have any impact on the income distribution (components v, vi 
and viii). This is broadly consistent with the evidence of constant graduate wage 
premia (Walker and Zhu, 2008; Machin, 2011).
Some of the income changes along the distribution are not explained by the 
changes to education and wages and are captured in the residual (component x in 
Figure 2). The break-down by income source (Figure E.1) shows that there were 
income gains from earnings and self-employment income for the bottom ventile 
groups as part of the residual. This is consistent with Belfield et al. (2017) and 
Blundell et al. (2018) who document a reduction in the number of men working 
full-time and an increase in part-time (less than 30 hours per week) employment 
which is attributed to increased inequality of male earnings. Belfield et al. (2017) 
find an increase in self-employment, in the number of one-earner households and 
their relative size at the bottom of the distribution.
4.2.2. Income Changes in 2007–11
We now present results from repeating the above analysis for the crisis (2007–
11) period. Between 2007 and 2011 and in contrast to the earlier period, the PCMI 
effect on net incomes led to an average loss of 1.5 percent (for All), although 
this was not statistically significantly different from zero (Figure 3). The income 
changes were U-shaped with small gains at the bottom and top ventiles and losses 
along the rest of the distribution.
As in 2001–07, the main components contributing to the PCMI effect during 
the crisis were changes to wages and the education composition. Changes to wages 
(component iv) contributed to a small reduction in average net incomes of 1.3 
percent (statistically significant at the 10 percent level). They led to income losses 
along the entire distribution apart from the 17th to 20th ventiles where incomes 
changes were not statistically significant.
On the other hand, education expansion (component ix) continued to raise 
net incomes—by 3 percent on average—during the crisis: as the amount of edu-
cation increased on average across all ventiles, there were income gains at all parts 
of the distribution. These were somewhat larger for the first and last ventiles and 
were overall more equally distributed across ventile groups, compared to 2001–07. 
Breaking down the change in net income in 2007–11 by income source (Figure E.2) 
shows that education expansion contributed to statistically significant increases 
in mean earnings (2.5 percent) and other market incomes, in particular private 
pensions (1 percent). Increases in investment income were smaller, at 0.2 percent.
The wage returns to HE (by sex and ethnicity) (components v-viii in Figure 3) 
remained constant in the crisis despite the continuous increase in the number of 
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university graduates. Blundell et al. (2016) document the same pattern. They sug-
gest that firms have responded to the increased supply of graduates through a 
decentralization of the organization structure.
The remaining changes in net income, which are not explained by the edu-
cation and wages changes, are shown in the residual (component x in Figure 3): 
they were pro-poor resulting in smaller income losses at the bottom than the rest 
of the distribution. These losses can be largely attributed to the increase in unem-
ployment during the crisis. In the first to fourth ventiles there were also further 
relative increases in the number of one-earner households (compared to no-earner 
households).
4.2.3. Income Changes in 2011–17
Next, we repeat the decomposition analysis for the post-crisis period 
(2011–17). Similar to 2001–07, changes to PCMI led to net income gains of 4.4 
percent on average (for All in Figure 4). Across the bottom 19 ventiles, the income 
gains ranged between 3 percent (19th ventile) and 6.6 percent (9th ventile). Only 
for the richest income ventile, net income fell by 2.3 percent, although this was not 
a statistically significant change.
Figure 3. Decomposing the Change in Mean Incomes Between 2007 and 2011 
Notes: HE  =  higher education; wBm  =  white British men; nwBm  =  non-white-British men; 
wBw  =  white British women; nwBw  =  non-white-British women. The total change and the total 
PCMI effect are illustrated repeatedly in each graph. What differs across graphs is the change in 
net income due to the PCMI component. The PCMI components sum up to the total PCMI effect. 
Changes to incomes are in real terms. Household ranking is not fixed, based on the respective (actual or 
counterfactual) distribution of equivalized household net income. Confidence intervals are estimated 
after 400 bootstrap replications.
Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
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As with the previous periods, the two main components of the PCMI effect 
that contributed to income changes were changes to wages (component iv) and 
the education composition (component ix). Although changes to wages did not 
have an effect on the overall mean, average net income went up in the bottom 15 
ventiles, and fell in the richest three ventiles (though the loss was not statistically 
significantly different from zero).
In the post-crisis period, net income continued to go up due to the education 
expansion (component ix), with an increase of 3.8 percent on average. Education 
expansion led to income gains across the entire distribution, similar to the changes 
in 2007–11. These gains were primarily due to earnings which went up on average 
by 3.6 percent but also to self-employment income which increased by 0.6 percent 
on average (Figure E.3).7
7Appendix F includes results for the change in income by age group, based on equivalized house-
hold incomes. In summary, we find that in each period education expansion led to income gains along 
the age distribution which were largest for the age groups of 30–34, 35–39, 40–44. There were large in-
come gains due to education expansion also among the younger age groups of 0–19 (due to shared in-
come gains within the household).
Figure 4. Decomposing the Change in Mean Incomes Between 2011 and 2017 
Notes: HE  =  higher education; wBm  =  white British men; nwBm  =  non-white-British men; 
wBw  =  white British women; nwBw  =  non-white-British women. The total change and the total 
PCMI effect are illustrated repeatedly in each graph. What differs across graphs is the change in 
net income due to the PCMI component. The PCMI components sum up to the total PCMI effect. 
Changes to incomes are in real terms. Household ranking is not fixed, based on the respective (actual or 
counterfactual) distribution of equivalized household net income. Confidence intervals are estimated 
after 400 bootstrap replications.
Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
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We find a small drop in mean net income of 0.7 percent due to changes in 
the HE returns for white British women (component vii in Figure 4). The income 
reduction was biggest (more than 1 percent) for the richest three ventiles. When 
we break down the change in net income by income source (Figure E.3), we esti-
mate a loss in mean earnings of 2 percent–3 percent in those richest three ventiles. 
Part of this loss was offset by automatic reductions in tax liabilities, leading to the 
smaller loss in overall net income. We do not find any evidence for changes in the 
HE returns for male and non-white-British female workers and so, household net 
incomes remain unchanged (components v, vi and viii in in Figure 4).
The residual (component x) captures increases in mean net income across 
most of the distribution, although none of these changes were statistically signifi-
cantly different from zero.
4.2.4. Tax-Benefit Policy Changes
We now return to Figure  1b which presents the TBP effect (in black) and 
compares it with the PCMI effect (in dark grey). In summary, policy changes in 
the 2000s were pro-poor, benefiting mostly the bottom of the income distribu-
tion and offsetting the increased disparities due to education composition changes 
(and changes to wages in 2001–07). But unlike in the 2000s, the TBP effect in 
2011–17 had a reverse-U shape: offsetting some of the income gains due to educa-
tion expansion at the bottom of the distribution and reinforcing the gains in the 
middle.
In more detail, between 2001 and 2007, changes to TBP led to clear income 
gains for the first half  of the distribution, with the largest gains for the poorest ven-
tiles. This was in stark contrast with the regressive PCMI effect due to education 
expansion and changes to wages. The pro-poor policy changes were the result of 
increased generosity in tax credits and means-tested benefits. In the top ventiles, on 
the other hand, mean incomes fell by a small but statistically significant share, due 
to increased tax liabilities and NI contributions. Between 2007 and 2011, the shape 
of the TBP effect was again progressive although less so compared to the earlier 
period. The TBP effect led to gains along the entire distribution, apart from the 
last ventile (due to the introduction of the top 50 percent marginal tax rate). This 
result is again different from the U-shaped and mostly negative PCMI effect. The 
analysis by Paulus et al. (2020) provides an in-depth discussion of the TBP effect in 
the UK in 2001–07 and 2007–11.
It is worth noting that incomplete take-up of means-tested benefits had an 
effect for the TBP results. In 2001–07, if  means-tested benefits were taken up by 
all entitled families, the gains for the poorest ventiles due to the TBP effect would 
have been larger than with incomplete take-up. Furthermore, the gains for the first 
ventile would have been larger than those for the following, richer ventile groups. 
However, in 2007–11, due to the erosion to the real value of means-tested benefits 
and incomplete take-up of these benefits, the net income gain (mixture of changes 
to means-tested benefits, non-means-tested benefits and pensions, income taxes 
and national insurance contributions) for the bottom two ventiles was bigger than 
it would have been had all eligible families have taken up their means-tested benefit 
entitlements.
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Between 2011 and 2017, the TBP effect had a reverse U-shape (somewhat similar 
to the PCMI effect), leading to income losses at the bottom of the distribution, no 
change for the richest ventile and gains for the remaining ventile groups (see also De 
Agostini et al., 2018; Bourquin et al., 2019). The income losses at the bottom were the 
result of cuts to means-tested and other benefits, which completely offset the gains 
due to education expansion. The gains in the middle of the distribution were due to 
reductions in income taxes (as the personal allowance increased), reinforcing the gains 
from wages and education expansion captured in the PCMI effect.
4.3. Decomposing Inequality Changes
In this section, we turn to decomposing changes in aggregate measures of 
income inequality by period. For the composition effect of  education changes on 
inequality, we find that education expansion led to higher income inequality in the 
2000s and this was mainly driven by changes in the pre-crisis period. In 2001–07 
(Table 3), our results show that education expansion (ix) is the main component 
of the PCMI effect that explains the rise in net income inequality. In 2007–11 
(Table 4), the gains from education expansion were more equally distributed than 
in 2001–07. Thus, education changes continued to widen the gap between rich and 
poor but to a smaller extent and the effect was no longer statistically significant. 
In 2011–17 (Table 5), education expansion increased further disparities in income 
TABLE 3  
decomposIng InequalIty changes (In % poInts) betWeen 2001 and 2007
Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1) Atkinson (2) CV
Total change −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.004 −0.001
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
PCMI effect 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.019**
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
iv) changes to wages 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.006
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012)
v) changes to returns 
to HE: wBm
−0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
vi) changes to returns 
to HE: nwBm
−0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
vii) changes to re-
turns to HE: wBw
−0.001* −0.000* −0.001* −0.001* −0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
viii) changes to re-
turns to HE: nwBw
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
v) to viii) changes to 
returns to HE: all
−0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
ix) changes to educa-
tion composition
0.007*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
x) residual 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.013)
TBP effect −0.013*** −0.005*** −0.010*** −0.020*** −0.021***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Notes: HE  =  higher education; wBm  =  white British men; nwBm  =  non-white-British men; 
wBw = white British women; nwBw = non-white-British women; PCMI = population characteristics 
and market incomes; TBP = tax-benefit policies. Significance levels indicated as ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, 
∗∗∗p < 0.01 and standard errors shown in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors after 400 replications.
Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
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according to most inequality indicators (apart from the coefficient of variation for 
which the change was not statistically significant).
We find limited evidence for a compression effect of education changes on 
inequality since the 2000s: in the growth period of 2001–07 (Table 3), changes to the 
returns for white British women (vii) were slightly equalizing (the inequality drop 
was statistically significant at the 10 percent level) for all measures, apart from the 
coefficient of variation. The returns to HE among men and non-white-British 
women remained, however, broadly unchanged and hence, did not affect income 
inequality. Changes to the returns to HE for all workers (v to viii) also did not have 
any impact on inequality. In the crisis years (2007–11) (Table  4), the continued 
absence of changes to the HE wage premia led to no effect on inequality. In 2011–17 
(Table 5), as in 2001–07, we find a reduction in inequality due to changes in the 
returns to HE for white British female workers. But changes to the HE wage premia 
for men and non-white-British women, as well as changes to the HE returns for all 
workers, had no statistically significant impact on the inequality indicators.8
8To test if  our results are sensitive to the trimming of the bottom 4 percent and top 1 percent of the 
income distribution, we repeated the decomposition analysis including all household observations. Our 
conclusions for the education composition and compression effects continue to broadly hold. Results 
are available from the author upon request.
TABLE 4  
decomposIng InequalIty changes (In % poInts) betWeen 2007 and 2011
Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1) Atkinson (2) CV
Total change −0.007* −0.003 −0.006** −0.012** −0.004
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012)
PCMI effect 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.015
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
iv) changes to wages 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.015
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.012)
v) changes to returns 
to HE: wBm
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
vi) changes to 
returns to HE: 
nwBm
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
vii) changes to re-
turns to HE: wBw
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
viii) changes to 
returns to HE: 
nwBw
−0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
v) to viii) changes to 
returns to HE: all
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
ix) changes to educa-
tion composition
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
x) residual −0.006 −0.002 −0.005 −0.009* −0.009
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.014)
TBP effect −0.008*** −0.003*** −0.006*** −0.011*** −0.019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Notes: HE  =  higher education; wBm  =  white British men; nwBm  =  non-white-British men; 
wBw = white British women; nwBw = non-white-British women; PCMI = population characteristics 
and market incomes; TBP = tax-benefit policies. Significance levels indicated as ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, 
∗∗∗p < 0.01 and standard errors shown in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors after 400 replications.
Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
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Looking at earlier periods (1978 to 1991 and 1991 to 2008), Brewer and Wren-
Lewis (2015) decompose changes to income inequality by different factors one 
of which is the education level of the highest earner in the household and their 
partner. In comparison, we account for changes in education in the whole (work-
ing-age) population since the early 2000s. They find that changes to the distribu-
tion of education have raised inequality, consistent with our evidence for 2001–17. 
For changes to the returns to education, they find they contributed to an inequality 
increase in 1978–91 and an inequality reduction in 1991–2008. In comparison, we 
estimate that changes to the HE returns for white British women only have lowered 
slightly inequality.
Our results for increased income inequality due to education expansion in the 
pre-crisis period are also consistent with the evidence on increased wage inequality 
(Lindley and Machin, 2013). Lindley and Machin (2013) suggest a key explanation 
for rising wage inequality in the UK is the increased relative demand for educated 
workers driven by technological change.
Furthermore, the increase in income inequality due to education expansion is 
likely to stem from inequality in education attainment. In the 1980s and 1990s, UK 
HE participation among children from richer families rose faster than among chil-
dren from poorer backgrounds (Blanden and Machin, 2004). Although education 
TABLE 5  
decomposIng InequalIty changes (In % poInts) betWeen 2011 and 2017
Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1) Atkinson (2) CV
Total change −0.006 −0.003 −0.004 −0.001 −0.031**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013)
PCMI effect −0.007* −0.003* −0.005* −0.006 −0.027**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.013)
iv) changes to wages −0.010 −0.004 −0.008 −0.011 −0.029
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.018)
v) changes to returns 
to HE: wBm
−0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
vi) changes to returns 
to HE: nwBm
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
vii) changes to re-
turns to HE: wBw
−0.002** −0.001** −0.002** −0.003** −0.005**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
viii) changes to re-
turns to HE: nwBw
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
v) to viii) changes to 
returns to HE: all
−0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
ix) changes to educa-
tion composition
0.003** 0.001** 0.002** 0.004** 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
x) residual 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.022)
TBP effect 0.001*** 0.000** 0.002*** 0.005*** −0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Notes: HE  =  higher education; wBm  =  white British men; nwBm  =  non-white-British men; 
wBw = white British women; nwBw = non-white-British women; PCMI = population characteristics 
and market incomes; TBP = tax-benefit policies. Significance levels indicated as ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, 
∗∗∗p  <  0.01 and standard errors shown in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors after 400 
replications.
Source: Author’s calculations using EUROMOD and the Family Resources Survey.
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inequality fell in the 2000s, there is less evidence for a reduction in inequality at 
higher levels of education attainment (Crawford, 2012, Blanden and Macmillan, 
2014).9
For the other PCMI components, we find that wage changes (iv) did not have 
any statistically significant effect on inequality in any of the periods, although in 
2011–17 their inequality-reducing effect was relatively sizeable (Table 5). The resid-
ual (x) led to a statistically significant (at the 10 percent level) reduction in inequal-
ity only in 2007–11 for the Atkinson index with aversion parameter of 2 (Table 4). 
It did not have any other statistically significant impact on inequality in the other 
two periods.
Finally, despite the upward pressure on inequality due to education expan-
sion, the reason why we see no change or even a small reduction in inequality in 
the 2000s is due to the TBP effect, especially in the boom period. This result is in 
line with the literature on the redistributive effect of policy changes (see e.g. De 
Agostini et al., 2016; Paulus et al., 2020). However, in 2011–17, while tax-bene-
fit policy changes reduced the level of the coefficient of variation, they increased 
inequality measured by the Gini and Atkinson indices; thus, offsetting part of the 
reductions achieved in the 2000s and reinforcing the inequality-increasing effect of 
education expansion.
5. conclusIons
Education attainment in Great Britain increased substantially between 2001 
and 2017. This paper analyses how this recent education expansion affected the 
distribution of household net incomes.
We find that, between 2001 and 2017, education expansion led to higher liv-
ing standards mostly through higher earnings, but the effect was not the same 
across the income distribution. As income gains in the middle and the top of the 
distribution were larger than the income gains at the bottom, the education com-
position effect raised income inequality (mostly through more unequal earnings 
distribution).
We find limited evidence for an education compression effect on inequality: 
we estimate a small drop in inequality due to a reduction in the HE wage premia 
among white British women only, in 2001–07 and 2011–17. We find no change to 
the returns to HE for this group in 2007–11. As the wage returns to HE among 
male and non-white-British female workers remained broadly unchanged in all 
periods, they had no impact on the distribution of household incomes.
As education expansion worsens income inequality, there may be implications 
for equality of opportunity and social mobility. An important policy concern for 
equality of opportunity is whether education expansion benefits disproportionally 
9An important aspect of education changes is the increase in educational assortative mating in the 
UK and other countries, documented elsewhere. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that changes to 
educational assortative mating explain little of the changes in income inequality (see e.g. Breen and 
Salazar, 2010, Boertien and Permanyer, 2019, Eika et al., 2019). In our paper, although we do not iden-
tify separately the impact of changes to assortative mating they are part of the education composition 
effect (as our control totals in the re-weighting procedure include household composition).
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2019
23
© 2020 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
children from more affluent families. Our data do not allow us to answer directly 
this question and so, we draw on the related literature: although, as the average 
level of education attainment increased, education inequality fell in the 2000s 
(compared to an increase in the 1980s and 1990s), there is little evidence show-
ing that inequality at higher levels of education attainment has fallen (Crawford, 
2012; Blanden and Macmillan, 2014). Furthermore, the positive link between edu-
cation expansion and income inequality may have implications for social mobility. 
International comparisons suggest low levels of intergenerational income mobility 
in the UK linked to the relatively high level of income inequality (Corak, 2013; 
Jerrim and Macmillan, 2015). There is also evidence suggesting that social mobility 
in the UK is falling (Nicoletti and Ermisch, 2007; Gregg et al., 2017) although the 
links to changes to income inequality have not been studied so far.
However, in 2007–11 and 2011–17 we find that the income gains due to edu-
cation composition changes were more equally distributed than in 2001–07. This 
suggests that further education expansion may start lowering inequality as fewer 
low-educated people remain. Furthermore, it is likely that the expansion of HE 
will eventually push down the education wage differential for all types of worker 
and, with it, income inequality. It remains to be seen how the changing education 
distribution will play out on income inequality in the future.
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